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Below I prove the two propositions from the paper, and oer extended analysis of the example
introduced in Section 2. Equation numbers here refer to equations in the paper. All equations
exclusive to the appendix are denoted with an \A."
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
It was established in the text that for any  > 0 and V 2 (0;1), an individual seller's optimal
strategy will either be to set pH = 1 or to set pL given by (5), with QL =  ln(V ). Therefore,
there are only three candidate equilibrium: all sellers set some pL <  p(V ) ( = 1), all sellers set
pH = 1 ( = 0), and sellers mix between the two strategies ( 2 (0;1)). It is straight-forward to
establish that  = 0 if and only if  = 0.1 Therefore, the only two possible cases are  = 1 and
 2 (0;1).
If all sellers set the same price, buyers randomize equally across them and Q
L = b. Thus, if
 = 1, p
L = 1   (be b)=(1   e b) and prots are 1   (1 + b)e b. This is optimal if and only if
1   (1 + b)e b  1   e (1 )b
,   ln (1 + b)=b  ^ :
Therefore,   ^  ,  = 1.
Now consider a two-price equilibrium. When a fraction  of rms set price pL <  p, informed
buyers will randomize across only these rms, while uninformed buyers continue to randomize
1That  = 0 ) 
 = 0 is immediate, as  = 0 implies that demand is completely inelastic. To see that

 = 0 )  = 0, suppose that 
 = V
 = 0 and  > 0. A seller could deviate to p
d = 1    for any arbitrarily
small  > 0, and all informed buyers would visit this seller (i.e. Q
d = 1). Note that (a) such a deviation would
be protable, as 
d = 1    > 1   e
 QH, and (b) the informed buyers' incentive constraint is not violated, as
limQ!1 (Q)(1   )  V
 = 0.
1across all sellers. From the second equilibrium condition in denition 1, the expected number of
informed buyers that will visit these sellers is determined by:
b =
Z









+ 1   

: (A-1)
Using (6), then, we can express the candidate equilibrium prots from setting pL as a function of
:
L() = 1   [1 + QL()]e QL():
Given the analysis above, L(1) < H ,  < ^ : Since L is clearly a continuous function on
the domain  2 (0;1], one can appeal to the intermediate value theorem by showing that (a)
lim!0 L() > H, and (b) @L=@ < 0 while @H=@ = 0.
From equation (A-1), lim!0 QL() = 1. By L'Hospital's rule, limQ!1(1 + Q)e Q = 0, so










L is strictly decreasing in , and  < ^  implies that there exists a unique  2 (0;1) such that
L() = H. That  2 (0;1) )  < ^  follows easily from the results above.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose S   1 sellers post price p and a single seller deviates to price pd. This seller's prots are
~ (pd;p) = ~ (d)pd; (A-2)
where d satises





= (1   pd)~ (d) (A-3)
for pd   p  1 f(1 p)~ [1=(S  1)]g=~ (0), and d = 0 for pd >  p. The prot function ~  is strictly






pd = 0 (A-4)
2is both a necessary and sucient condition to characterize the unique prot-maximizing price pd,
conditional on attracting informed buyers with strictly positive probability.





































+ (1   pd)~ 0(d)
< 0 (A-6)
for p 2 [0;  p], clearly @2~ 
@p2
d
< 0 on this domain if d is concave in pd.2 Manolis Galenianos & Philipp
Kircher (2009) establish that this is true if (i) ~ (d) is increasing and concave, (ii) ~ (d) is decreasing
and convex, and (iii) ~ (d) 1 is convex.3 The rst of these properties is trivial to establish. To see
that the second and third also hold, it is helpful to derive an alternative (equivalent) representation

















i + k + 1
:









































If we denote the rst and second derivatives of ~  by ~ 0 and ~ 00, respectively, then
~ 0() = (N   1)
Z 1
0









dy < 0 (A-8)
~ 00() = (N   1)(N   2)
Z 1
0









dy  0; (A-9)




2   ~ ()~ 00()  0 (A-10)
2The inequality in (A-6) follows immediately from the fact that ~ 
0() < 0, which is established below.
3See Lemma 3 and its proof in Galenianos & Kircher (2009).
3holds for  2 (0;1), which is true.4 Therefore, (A-5) uniquely determines the optimal price pd 2 [0;  p]
given p.





































In order to characterize the symmetric strategy equilibrium, I impose the conditions pd = p and
















Substituting (A-13) into (A-5) and solving yields (16). Finally, one must check that a seller would
not prefer to deviate to a price such that s = 0, but this is guaranteed precisely by the inequality
in (15).
Having established that ~ pL is the equilibrium price in this region of the parameter space, it is left
to show that ~ pL is increasing in N. However, since ~ pL is of the form ~ pL = 1=f1+2[N=(N  1)]g,
where 1 and 2 are positive constants that depend only on B and S, it follows immediately that
@~ pL=@N > 0.5


































This expression is decreasing in  and converges to zero as  ! 1, so it is weakly positive for all  2 [0;1].
5Clearly 2 = [1  ~ (1=S)]~ (1=S)[(B  1)=S]  0. To see that 1 = ~ (1=S)[~ (1=S) (1 1=S)
B 1]  0, note that
~ (1=S)   (1   1=S)




















Plugging in  = S   1 gives the desired result.
4B Example: The Case of N = 1 and U = 2
Now suppose that only one buyer is informed, and that the other two buyers will select a seller at
random. The optimal strategy of the informed buyer at the second stage is trivial: 
1(p1;p2) = 0
if p1 > p2, 1 if p1 < p2, and any value in [0;1] if p1 = p2.
Lemma 1. A symmetric strategy equilibrium must be a distribution F(p) that is (i) continuous,









Proof: Note that a seller can always earn expected prots of at least 3=4 by setting a price equal
to 1, so it can never be a best response to set a price p < 3=4 and we can restrict attention to prices
in the domain [3=4;1]. The proof proceeds as follows. That F has continuous, connected support
over some interval [pmin;pmax]  [3=4;1] is stated without proof.6 Given this, it will be established
that (i) pmax = 1, (ii) pmin = 3=4, and (iii) F(pmin) = 0.
In a slight abuse of notation, denote the expected prots of seller s setting price ps, given the
other seller's strategy F(), by
s(ps;F) = ps
















Therefore, it must be that pmax = 1 and the expected equilibrium prots 
s = 3=4. Second,















Therefore, it must be that pmin = 3=4. Lastly, suppose that F(pmin) =  > 0. Since 
1(3=4;3=4)































Given this result, it is straight-forward to characterize the unique equilibrium strategy F(p) =
4 3=p as the solution to the equality 3
4 = s(ps;F) for ps 2 [3=4;1]. In this equilibrium, the average
price is ~ pC
L =
R 1




[1   F(p)]2dp + 3
4  :822.
6The argument is completely standard, following Burdett & Judd (1983).
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